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                                                          Abstract
Since the early-1990s arrangements for social protection in most 
of the advanced industrialized nations have undergone a series of
policy reforms that are restructuring the mixed economy of 
modern welfare states. This paper reviews several fundamental 
reasons for these changes and their substantive character, 
focusing on   the increasing role of the private sector in the 
finance and delivery of welfare state activity. Three basic modes 
to increase private responsibility for heretofore publicly financed 
and publicly delivered social provisions are identified, illustrating 
alternative paths which advance the movement toward 
privatization. The assumptions and implications associated with 
these modes of privatization are analyzed.
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3Since the early-1990s the advanced industrial welfare states 
among the member countries of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development have experienced a wave of 
welfare policy reforms that have altered the nature of public 
responsibility for the provision of social welfare.  In describing the 
context of change this paper begins with a brief examination of 
several demographic and social forces that have created 
pressures for policy reforms and then reviews the substantive 
dimensions of the shift in policies introduced by these reforms.   
The dimensions of change include the heightened targeting of 
social benefits, an emphasis on work-oriented incentives, and the 
increasing “privatization” of social welfare. Within this context of 
change, the paper focuses on the growth of privatization, which 
takes place through various arrangements between public and 
private agents.  Analyzing a range of these alternative public-
4private arrangements  the paper develops a typology that 
classifies different methods of privatization according to three 
modes of delivery and finance.  Within the conceptual framework 
of this typology, we can identify the various methods and clarify 
the interaction of public and private agents in the process of 
privatization. The conclusion offers some thoughts about the role 
of these alternative modes of  finance and delivery in the future 
course of privatization.  
Pressures for Change
Over the last two decades large-scale structural changes 
involving the demographic shift and globalization of the economy 
have generated increasing fiscal pressures to heighten the 
efficiency and lower the skyrocketing costs of social protection in 
the OECD countries.  With the aging of the population in the 21st 
century, the advanced industrialized member nations of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
have reached the take-off point of  what Lesthaeghe (1995) labels
the “second demographic transition.”  By 2050 these countries 
will have an average of 1 ½ workers supporting one retired 
5person, a precipitous decline from the current rate of 3 workers 
contributing to the support of one retired person.  The rise in one-
person households (expected to amount to 40% of all households 
in Germany by 2030) along with the growth in single parent 
families and female labor force participation necessitate 
additional forms of public aid, particularly the provision of daycare
for young children (OECD,2012) .
As these demographic developments place additional demands 
on welfare spending, tremendous fiscal pressures are building on 
the welfare state—and especially on the younger generation that 
has to carry the burgeoning costs of an aging population.  One 
example of the escalating demand for social expenditures coming
our way is phenomenal costs of dementia care for the elderly in 
the United States. The price of this care is expected to more than 
double from $215 billion in 2010 to $511 billion in 2040 (Hurd, 
Martorell, Delavande, Mullen, Langa, 2013) . 
6At the same time that upheavals in the demographic landscape of
family life are expanding social needs, economic globalization has
accelerated the mobility of capital to go where production costs 
are low. This has heightened competition on the world market and
intensified pressures to lower production costs by scaling back 
labor rights and welfare benefits (Standing, 1999).  Following this 
line of analysis, Scharpf (2000) sees tighter fiscal constraints 
looming, which entail painful policy adjustments that will be more 
difficult for the Continental welfare states (e.g., France, Germany, 
Italy , the Netherlands, Belgium, and Austria) than the welfare 
states in Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon countries.
In addition to the economic constraints generated by 
demographic and market forces, other forces for change have 
emerged based on increased knowledge about the impact of 
social policies that has been gained over time and heightened 
appreciation for the private sector. By the 1990s, after decades of
rising welfare and disability rolls, one of the lessons learned 
involved the unanticipated consequences of social benefits, 
7particularly their disincentive effects.  The idea that generous 
welfare benefits might inhibit one’s inclination to work was at one 
time criticized by welfare state advocates as “blaming the victim”
(Ryan, 1976).    However, by the 1990s the  idea that generous 
welfare benefits  can produce  “poverty traps” or “enforced 
dependency”  was widely accepted in OECD countries (Bradshaw 
and Miller, 1990; OECD, 1998).  One  OECD (1991)  report goes so
far as to note that "dependency traps are an unintended outcome
of most social security systems."  Finally, the collapse of the 
command-economy of the USSR  give a boost to  public faith in 
the functioning of the private market and consumer choice.  
Although this enthusiasm for the private market dampened 
somewhat after the world-wide recession that began in 2007, 
privatization and consumer choice continue to remain well-
received.
Substantive Dimensions of Policy Change
These complex and multiple forces have lent impetus to 
modifying the central tendencies of policies that guided the 
8design of  the most progressive modern welfare state  -- policies 
which emphasized   (1) universal approach to (2) publicly 
delivered benefits designed as (3) social rights to (4) protect labor
against the vicissitudes of the market. As shown in  Table 1, which
conveys this shift as a movement  from the welfare state to the 
enabling state, the revised framework of social welfare policy 
reform now accentuates a  (1) selective approach to (2) private 
delivery of provisions designed to (3) promote labor force 
participation and reinforce (4) social responsibility (Gilbert and 
Gilbert,1989;  Gilbert,2004). 
9Numerous scholars have analyzed these developments 
emphasizing various dimensions of the change as well as the 
overall movement, which Ferge (1966) was among the first to 
identify as a paradigm shift.  By 2013, in a volume that examines 
the changing landscape of the welfare state Evers and Guillemard
(2013:360) conclude that regardless of  whether the change is 
called the social investment  state,  the active welfare state, or 
the enabling state, “the welfare state is being remodeled and the 
founding principles of the postwar arrangement are being 
transformed… This reconfiguration reflects a change in the 
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paradigms underlying the postwar welfare state.”   How different 
scholars interpret this change varies. Some see it as leading 
toward a convergence of modern welfare states policies (Lodemel
and  Moreira, in press; Gilbert , 2002;  Kangas, 1994). Although 
Danforth (2013) finds that  Esping-Andersen’s (1990) 
conventional tripartite typology  -- liberal, conservative and social 
democratic regimes – continued to offer a relevant description of 
modern welfare states up until the late 1990s , by 2000 he 
observes a different classification in contemporary welfare states.
And Ferrera (2013)  detects not so much of a convergence as a 
combination of liberal and social democratic approaches.
Targeted Benefits. In regard to the specific dimensions of 
change, the increase in policies that target social benefits is 
described by Sunesson, et. al (1998)   as a “flight from 
universalism.”  Summing up findings on this trend reported in six 
countries, Gilbert (2001) notes that policies aimed at narrowing 
eligibility criteria are focusing benefits on those greatest in need 
of physical care and psychological attendance. Andries (1996) 
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describes the move toward means-tested  family allowance 
benefits in Belgium between 1980 -1995 as the method of 
“targeting within universalism,” under which the value of means-
tested benefits increased five-fold while the value of non-means-
tested allowances declined.  
Work-Oriented Measures. Examining the rise of work-related 
reforms Jessop (1994) and Torfing (1997) depict the change as a 
move from the welfare state to the Schumpeterian Workfare 
State. Their analysis contrasts John Maynard Keynes’s ideas about
the merits of state intervention in the market with  Joseph 
Schumpeter’s views on the fiscal limits of  taxation beyond which 
the state would sabotaged innovative activity and entrepreneurial
drive. Framed in a more positive light, this development has been
widely perceived as a move toward the “social investment” or 
“active” welfare state (Giddens, 1998; Lister 2013).    
Stretching across the political spectrum from Sweden to the 
United States, work-oriented reforms, such as the Revenu de 
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Solidarite’ Active (RSA) in France, the Hartz Reforms in Germany, 
the Danish Social Assistance Reforms of 1997 and the Universal 
Credit in the UK introduced a range of  policies designed to move 
welfare beneficiaries into the paid labor force (Lodemel and 
Moreira (in press).  In Norway the 1992 White Paper on 
Rehabilitation introduced the “Work Approach” to social policy, 
which stipulates “that individual rights are not exclusively tied to 
cash benefits; each individual has, as far as possible, a right and a
duty to work, to participate in rehabilitation programs or enter 
education ...” (Dahl and Dropping, 2001)  In Britain the New 
Labour government’s  Green Paper on Welfare Reform (1998), 
which  that in charting the future course of the welfare state:  
“The Government’s aim  is to rebuild the welfare state around 
work.”     In a similar vein, “Work, work, and work again” was the 
motto of the Dutch purple coalition, which was elected in mid-
1990s  and initiated the 1996 reform of social assistance 
(Vink,1998).
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Streeck (2007:545) finds these reforms represent “an almost 
universal restructuring of national welfare states in the direction 
of investment rather than consumption,  re-commodification 
instead of de-commodification, strengthening ‘employability’ 
instead of raising workers’ reservation wage, ‘activation’ for the 
market instead of protection from it.”   Similarly Alber (2010)  
sees the emphasis on activation as “a profound transformation of 
European social democracy which is of historic proportions.”   
According to his assessment around the turn of the 21st century 
the European Labor movement abandoned support of welfare 
policies designed to de-commodify labor in favor of  work-oriented
measures to enable people to go participate in the market.
Privatization. Finally the increasing market-oriented approach in
the changing balance of public and private responsibility for the 
finance and delivery of social benefits has been well documented,
variously referred to as the “contract state” (Eardley, 1997; 
Weatherly, 1994) the “Hollow State” (Milward and Provan 1993)  
the “New Welfare Mix” (Evers and Svetlik, 1993) and more 
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generally privatization of the welfare state (Gilbert, 2004;  
Marwell, 2004; Zehavil, 2012).  Empirically, the growing role of 
private financing among the OECD countries was initially 
calculated by  Adema and  Einerhand  (1998). 
At the same time, the trend toward privatization was also quite 
evident in the increasing role of private providers in the delivery 
of social benefits. Thus, for example, in  Germany  for-profit 
agencies were excluded by law from providing long-term care 
until the mid-1990s. When a new long-term insurance scheme 
opened the door to commercial providers in 1994, they jumped at
the opportunity and  by 2000 for-profit providers accounted for 
half of all the services and one-third of the long-term care 
personnel (Alber, 2003).  Between 1995 and 1998 for-profit 
providers in Norway experienced a 10%  increase in their share of
residential home for children and youth  (Slettebo,2000).   And 
between 1979 and 1996 in the United Kingdom the proportion of 
all public expenditures on personal social services contracted out 
15
to the private sector  more than tripled, from 11-to-34 percent 
( Burchardt, 1997).
Three Modes: A Typology of Privatization
Of course, 1historically many welfare states have been built upon 
a mix of public and private responsibility for both the finance and 
delivery of social benefits.  Thus, while the English Poor Law of 
1601 established the principle that relief of the poor was a public 
concern of local parishes, in the same year the English Law of 
Charitable Uses encouraged the expansion of private philanthropy
(Trattner, 1999).  And 1before the earliest state-sponsored 
pensions were introduced in Germany,  religious bodies organized
major welfare associations, such as the Catholic Caritas and the 
Protestant Diako’nia. With about  800,000 staff, these charitable 
agencies are  among Europe’s largest employers (Alber,2003) .    
Although social provisions by private agencies have long been a 
feature of many welfare states, since the 1990s  private activity 
by both voluntary and for profit organizations has vastly 
expanded to the point that modern welfare states are in the midst
of  a significant restructuring of the mixed economy of welfare. 1 
This development is advanced by policies that limit the direct role
of the state and increase private activity in the financing and 
delivery of social benefits with the aim of reducing public 
expenditure and increasing the quality of social welfare provisions
(Gilbert and Terrell, 2013).    Privatization is accelerating at 
different speeds along the avenues of finance and delivery.   The 
private financing of social protection is expanding slowly but 
steadily, while the private sector’s involvement in the delivery of 
publicly funded social provisions has advanced rapidly in many 
fields.  
 In examining the alternatives in financing and delivery of social 
welfare provisions there are three fundamental modes for 
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increasing private responsibility.  As illustrated in Table 2, in each 
case privatization involves the delivery of social welfare 
provisions through the private sector via voluntary and for-profit 
agencies. What varies in these cases are the manner and extent 
of the government role in  financing the social provisions.  Within 
each mode of privatization there are several alternative paths 
that lead to market-like approaches to social welfare. While these 
pathways do not exhaust the possibilities, they illustrate a range 
of methods currently employed in the movement toward 
privatization.
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Direct Spending.  Each mode of privatization is distinguished 
mainly by the way these social services and benefits are financed.
At one end we have social benefits that are directly and entirely 
financed by public funds,  but produced and delivered through the
private sector. These arrangements include both the use of 
vouchers and third party contracts for provisions such as work 
training courses, education, food and housing. Thus, for example, 
18
the Netherlands, France, and Denmark opened the provision of 
employment services to private providers through third-party 
contracts, while Germany opted to provide vouchers, which 
allowed those in need of employment services to purchase them 
from private providers on the market (Lodemel and Moreira, in 
press). In the United States public housing that was once offered 
mainly as a provision in-kind financed and produced directly by 
the state, has been largely replaced by Section 8 housing 
vouchers that allow 3.5 million low-income residents to rent in the
private market Gilbert and Terrell, 2013). In Sweden families are 
eligible to receive vouchers amounting to 75% of public education
costs, which can be used to send their children to independent 
schools. Since 1991 the number of independent schools in 
Sweden has increased five-fold, including more than one quarter 
of a million people by 2005 (Rojas, 2005).  Vouchers are similar to
cash benefits in that they promote consumer choice generating 
market signals that spur competition. Third-party contracts often 
seek to introduce a market-like approach by the use of 
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competitive bidding for service contracts among private 
providers. 
Third-party contracts are the most familiar and rapidly expanding 
method of privatization. This approach directly allocates public 
funds to contract with voluntary and  for-profit organizations for 
the production and delivery of social services – the process is 
sometimes referred to as outsourcing. Over the last two decades, 
for-profit providers have substantially increased their market 
share of social welfare services. 1 Since the mid-1990s, there has 
been an avalanche of multi-million-dollar contracts with for profit 
organizations to provide welfare case management, training, job-
search and placements services, long-term care for the elderly, 
residential services for children, probation services, health care 
and many other human services. In the U.S. for example, 
Maximus, Inc. had a total of a $100 million in government 
contracts for services such as child support enforcement  and 
welfare-to-work activities. Maximus was a relatively small firm 
20
compared to the mulit-billion dollar organizations such as 
Andersen Consulting and Lockheed Martin Information and 
Management Services, that sought contracts to operate
 entire welfare systems including intake and eligibility 
determination as well as employment and social services 
(Nightingale and Pindus, 1997).
These third-party-purchase-of-service arrangements can take 
several forms such as: fixed price, cost plus, and pay for 
performance (extra profit linked to outcomes) contracts. And 
there is also a special case of  proxy-shopping  proposed by Rose-
Ackerman (1983), which requires that the for-profit service 
provider attract a significant proportion of paying customers.  
These customers serve as “proxy shoppers” for public funders. In 
this way, government agency’s can use the behavior of private 
consumers to indirectly monitor the cost and quality of private 
services. The proxy-shopping proposal draws attention to one of 
the fundamental issues in third-party contract for service 
21
arrangements. In theory private providers are expected to be 
more responsive and efficient than public bureaucracies because 
the private sector supposedly benefits from the discipline of the 
market economy wherein competition and consumer choice 
generate efficiency, accountability and innovation which 
heightens the quality and lowers the cost of services. However, 
despite efforts to introduce a market-oriented approach to the 
provision of social welfare, these arrangements simply do not 
generate the discipline of market exchange.  Third-party contracts
by their very nature fail to provide the kind of consumer signals 
that serve to regulate cost and quality in the competitive market. 
Under third-party contracts,  the government as the first-party 
buyer pays for but does not consume the services acquired; the 
citizen as second-party,  consumes but does not pay for the 
services received – while the third-party, the for-profit pr1oducer, 
stands  in the highly advantageous position of dealing with a  
buyer who  rarely sees  what is purchased and a consumer who 
never bears the expense.
22
To the extent that there is any competition in the purchase-of-
service process, is usually among voluntary and for-profit 
contractors vying for funds to deliver social services.  Public 
agency managers responsible for implementing these 
arrangements are seeking the highest quality of services with the 
best outcomes at the lowest cost. Their task is complicated by the
difficulty of measuring the quality and outcome of many social 
services that deal with the care of elderly people, preschool 
children, youth in foster homes, disabled people and 
psychological provisions for people with mental illness. The cost 
of social provisions is more readily apparent than the quality. 
Paying private providers to deliver social welfare services in the 
United States often can be less costly than the delivery of the 
same services by public agencies. But, this is not necessarily due 
to the market discipline imposed by competition and choice. 
Rather cost savings in the U.S. often reflect the absence of 
unionized labor in private social welfare agencies, whose 
23
employees command lower salaries and benefits than the social 
workers in the civil service unions of public bureaucracies.  Unlike 
industrial production, union labor in the public arena of social 
welfare is largely devoted to providing services that could not 
easily be outsourced overseas to be performed at a lower cost. 
Between 1954 and  2003 union membership as a percent of the 
employed in the United States has declined by almost 60%, most 
of which was in the private sector. Of what remained of union 
labor in 2003 only 7.2% of those employed in the private sector 
were unionized compared to 37% of the public sector employees  
(Mayer,2004). Instead of being outsourced globally, the 
production and delivery of social services is currently being 
outsourced through third-party contracts to the private sector.
Indirect Spending Via Partial Subsidies for Private 
Spending. The mode of privatization based on outsourcing and 
vouchers is directly financed through government activities of 
taxing and spending. In contrast, the second mode of privatization
24
involves social welfare provisions such as health insurance, 
pensions, housing, day care and rehabilitation services that are 
financed voluntarily through private payments by organizations 
and individuals.  As Shown in Figure 1
these private social expenditures have been increasing 
substantially over the last two decades. 
                                                      Figure  1
Volutary Private Social Expenditure
as % of GDP (1985 - 2009)
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However, these private voluntary payments are not entirely a 
private matter.  The government plays an indirect role in these 
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financial arrangements, which involves partial and compensatory 
subsidies. This mix of public and private spending on social 
welfare includes various transactions such as a service that is 
initially privately purchased by a consumer, who is partially 
reimbursed later through a tax deduction and a private 
organization’s investment in the production and delivery of social 
provisions, for which it is later compensated by public funds. 
Although Pigou (1930)  recognized  that special tax deductions 
and exemptions represent a form of social expenditure, these 
expenses remained off the ledger of conventional accounting for 
public spending in the U.S. until 1974. The U.S, was among the 
first counties to systematically collect and report information on 
this form of social spending under the label of  “tax expenditures”
(Surrey, 1974).  Today tax expenditures are widely included in the
calculation of public spending on social welfare (Gilbert and 
Gilbert, 1989; Howard, 1999).  These expenditures are a way of 
indirectly subsidizing the private production and delivery of social 
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welfare through tax deductions, exemptions and credits for 
private purchases of certain benefits such as day care, housing, 
employment related private health insurance and old age 
pensions.  They are indirect subsidies in the sense that, for 
example, rather than the government’s taxing a citizen and then 
sending her a voucher to privately purchase a day care service, 
tax expenditures provide a credit that subsidizes the private 
purchase of a day care service after the purchase has been made.
In both cases the government has subsidized the citizen’s 
purchase of day care, once directly with tax money that it 
collected and once indirectly by not collecting tax money it was 
owed.
Another approach to the public private mix involves 
arrangements under which a private party or group of private 
investors initially put up private money to fund the production 
and delivery of a human service program.  If the privately funded 
program is successful in achieving agreed upon measurable 
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outcomes, the government reimburses the private parties for 
their investment including an agreed upon level of profit.  These 
public private partnership (PPP) arrangements,  are relatively new
and untested in the realm of social welfare.  Britain is credited 
with pioneering this approach with a prisoner rehabilitation 
program funded by a Social Impact Bond (SIB) in 2010. In 2012 a 
program aimed at limiting recidivism among prison inmates was 
launched in New York City, which included Goldman Sachs among
its investors.  The PPPs are attracting considerable interest, 
because they shift the large start-up costs and the financial risk of
providing a social program from the public to the private sector 
(Economist, 2013) . Private parties assume this risk, which 
accompanies the start-up of many private enterprises, -- in the 
hope of producing a successful program for which they will be 
rewarded with a profit. 
Regulatory Methods. Finally, privatization can be advanced 
when the regulatory powers of government  are used to shift the 
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responsibility and costs of public programs to the private market 
via legislative mandate. This approach allows governments to 
address social welfare needs without spending money or raising 
taxes. Although it has not yet been a widely traveled route to 
privatization of social welfare the regulatory method has gained 
use over the last two decades.  In the Netherlands, for example, 
the sickness insurance scheme was privatized in the 1990s, when 
reforms were introduced that required employers to assume the 
responsibility of paying  at least 70 percent of their worker’s 
salaries for 52 weeks of sick leave before the workers could 
qualify for public disability benefits (Geurts:  Kompier; and  
Grundemann, 2000).  Denmark and Sweden have also mandated 
increased employer coverage of sickness benefits. In 2005 
mandated private benefits for old age and incapacity amounted 
to an average of  0.7 %  of the GDP in 20 OECD countries for 
which data were available. (Adema and Ladaique, 2009). 
Implications for the Future Course of Privatization
29
This analysis of alternative modes of privatization suggests 
different ways that government may implement the increasing 
emphasis on public support for private responsibility in the 
finance and delivery of social welfare.   There is reason to think 
that the indirect and regulatory modes of privatization will expand
more rapidly than direct spending as governments struggle to 
balance fiscal constraints with the growing demands for increased
social expenditures. 
1Direct spending is supported largely by the tax revenues 
collected by government (though not entirely, since government 
can also raise money by borrowing).  The average tax rates in 
OECD countries climbed by more than a quarter from 25.8- to-
32.8 percent of the GDP over the 15 years between 1965 and 
1980.  From 1980 to 1997, however,  the rate of increase slowed 
down considerably ( and was even reversed in a few countries) 
creeping up  from 32.8- to-36.9 percent of the GDP over 17 years 
(OECD, 1999).  Between 2000 and 2010, the average tax rate as a
30
percent of GDP for the OECD countries was virtually flat with a 
slight decline from 35.2% to 33.8%, as shown in Figure 2. (OECD, 
2012)  Although there is still wiggle- room for some governments 
to maneuver, the  plateauing of taxes since 1980 lends weight to 
Besharov’s (1998) observation  that many governments are 
approaching a tax ceiling, that will be difficult to raise for political 
and economic reasons. Still for various reasons, not the least of 
which involve population aging, the states will come under 
intense pressure to increase social spending.  
Under these circumstances policy makers may be inclined to 
finance the continued privatization of social welfare in ways that 
involve greater sharing of the costs with private consumers and 
providers and do not immediately require additional taxes.  
 Indirect subsidies through tax expenditures,  partially reimburse 
private spending for social welfare provisions; public private 
partnerships shift the start-up costs and risks of failure to private 
investors. Although the use of the regulatory powers of 
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government to mandate the private provision of social benefits 
shifts the cost from                                 government to the 
private sector, there are concerns that the liberal employment of  
these measures would raise business costs for employers to the 
point that they would no longer be able to compete effectively on 
the global market.  
 Figure 2: Tax Revenue as  % of GDP: 2000 & 2010 
Statlink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932710441 
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Between 1990 and 2009  gross private social spending as a 
percent of GDP rose from an average of 1.8% to 2.7%  
()ECD,2013). As an absolute increase the change is slight, but 
relatively speaking private spending as a percent of GDP was 50%
higher in 2009 (well above the 23%  relative increase in direct 
gross public spending).  The turn of the century may mark the 
beginning of a steeply climbing rate of private spending for social 
welfare, particularly in the realm of old age pensions. Since 1992 
thirty countries have incorporated private individual accounts into
their mandatory pension systems, including Denmark, United 
Kingdom, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary (Kritzer, 2005) .  In 
2001 and 2004 Germany introduced government subsidies as 
incentives to increase private pensions (Leisering, 2012). The 
privatization of old age pensions in the United States involves an 
incremental process tacitly driven by policy realignments of 
incentives and benefits. Thus, a series of reforms since the 1980s 
have indirectly shrunk the benefits of social security by increasing
the retirement age from 65 to 67 (and there is continued talk of 
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going higher), raising the employer-employee tax rate and 
introducing an implicit means test by imposing an income tax on 
Social Security payments for retirees with a modest level of 
income from other sources (Steurle and Bakija 1994). 
These measures have reduced  the lifetime payout of Social 
Security benefits at all levels of income and  the size of the 
positive net transfers.  As the value of public pension benefits has
declined, private alternatives have expanded with the advent of 
individual retirement accounts, Keogh Plans (for the self-
employed) and 401K retirement accounts that receive highly 
beneficial tax treatment  (Gilbert and Gilbert, 1989).  Between 
1990 and 2008, participation in all types of private pension plans 
increased from 77 to 125 million people (86 million of whom were 
currently employed in 2008).  Over this period there has been a 
significant shift toward the use of defined contribution plans. 
Although private pensions were equally divided between defined 
benefit plans and defined contribution plans in 1990, by 2008 the 
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number of defined contribution plans had increased to twice that 
of defined benefit plans. The total assets of all private these plans
amounted to $4.7 trillion in 2008 (U.S Census Bureau, 2013).  
With the growth of private schemes and the shrinking of public 
benefits, the percent of retirement income from public pensions 
has declined relative to that derived from private pension plans 
(Park and Gilbert, 1999). As the elderly come to depend more on 
retirement income from defined contribution plans, they may 
voluntarily increase the age of retirement to raise the level of 
their benefits.
  
The movement in social welfare pensions toward private 
individualized accounts and defined contribution plans partially 
subsidized by favorable tax treatment may be a harbinger of the 
approach to privatization that will be favored by policy makers in 
the process of restructuring the mixed economy of social welfare. 
That is, using tax incentives and partial subsidies as a basic form 
of  public support for private responsibility to achieve financial 
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independence through increased work effort in the market 
economy. In the U.S. this approach can also been seen in the 
increasing growth of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which 
uses tax incentives to subsidize low-wage workers. At a cost of 
$42 billion in 2009, the EITC was the third largest U.S social 
welfare program targeted at low-income families (Spar, 2011).  In 
the process of restructuring the mixed economy of social welfare 
to advance public support for increased private responsibility the 
welfare state emerges more as a handmaiden than a counterforce
to the market economy. 
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